Friedrich Nietzsche


Friedrich Nietzsche studied classical philology at the universities of Bonn and Göttingen. He was so brilliant a student that, in 1868, he became a professor at the University of Basel without writing a dissertation or earning a doctorate. Soon afterward, he enlisted in the Swiss army and served briefly in the Franco-Prussian War. Injured in a riding accident from which he never fully recovered, he returned to and his teaching duties and, in 1872, published his first book, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music.

His and his later works, Nietzsche made no effort to appeal to the traditional code of the academic philologists, and his books were not well received. Not only were his subjects idiosyncratic, but his style was poetic, aphoristic, dramatic, colorful. Following the four Unpublished Meditations (1873–1876), on such topics as the will to power, the history of Greek eloquence, on such topics as the will to power, the history of Greek eloquence, and Richard Wagner, Nietzsche wrote Human, All Too Human (1878), a series of aphorisms addressed to the question of whether human beings are motivated by the desire for power and by fear of the power of others. Here, too, he began to formulate a philosophy of self-confidence that does not require taking advantage of others. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Parts 1–3, 1883; Part 4, 1892), Nietzsche works through many of his themes — the will to power, the meaning of style, the need to affirm life, and so on — but does so by means of epigrams, satire, and aphorism, rather than systematic argument. Of his seven books, the best known are Beyond Good and Evil (1886), The Antithesis of Morals (1887), The Twilight of the Idols (1889), and Ecce Homo (written 1888 and published posthumously).

Nietzsche delivered a series of lectures on classical rhetoric at Basel in 1872–73. The notes for these lectures, as well as for an additional seminar in 1874 at the University of Freiburg, were published posthumously. While Nietzsche's general approach to classical rhetoric is not particularly original — he follows a standard scholarly outline — he does offer in the lectures a number of interesting observations about rhetoric and language. A rhetorical style is one regarded as deliberately artistic and not natural, says Nietzsche. He suggests that if the work of the classical authors strikes us as especially rhetorical in this sense, it may be because of their orientation to oral discourse and our own to written discourse, a difference that shows up in the highly developed rhythms of the classical authors' prose, compared with the relative flatness of ours. But the verbal artistry ascribed to the classical authors is not confined to rhetoric, which should properly be understood as the conscious application of an essential quality of language itself.

There is obviously no untheorized "naturalness" of language to which one could appeal; language itself is the result of purely rhetorical art. The power to discover and to make operative that which works and impresses, with respect to each thing, a power which
Aristotle calls rhetoric, is at the same time, the essence of language; the latter is based just as little as rhetoric is upon that which is true, upon the essence of things. Language, Nietzsche continues, conveys not sensations but "copies of sensations," not things but images of our perception of things. Words are signs of our impulses and do not represent "a many-sided, respectable knowledge of things." In short, emphasizes Nietzsche, "language is rhetoric, because it desires to convey only a doxa [opinion], not an episteme [knowledge]."

Pursuing this idea further, Nietzsche says that tropes "are considered to be the most artistic means of rhetoric. But with respect to their meanings, all words are tropes in themselves." Tropes means "turn," a turning aside from literal meaning, but every word turns aside from the thing itself, offering a sound-image instead. "The tropes are not just occasionally added to words but constitute their true proper nature," he says. "It makes no sense to talk of a 'proper meaning' which is carried over to something else only in special cases . . . What is usually called language is actually all figuration."

Nietzsche's ideas about language inform his critique of philosophy and of common views about truth and knowledge. In his essay "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" (included here), written in 1873, just after he gave his course on rhetoric, Nietzsche argues that "truth" is a social arrangement necessitated by the powerful tendency to tell lies. Lying is clearly an act of discourse, a misrepresentation of actual circumstances. Truth must be seen similarly as a convention of discourse, for there is no way to convert things directly into language. We put our subjective impressions of things into our words and therefore must negotiate their meanings. Language "designates the relations of things to men," and these relations are expressed in "the boldest metaphors." But having evolved this means of communicating about things, we forget that it is a conventional arrangement and come to "believe that we know something about the things themselves . . . yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things." Social pressures reinforce the conventional ways of speaking of things and of regarding that way of speaking as truth. Metaphor formation is, according to Nietzsche, the fundamental quality of the human intellect. Thus, "truth" is a rhetorical construction, arising from the creative use of language for the purpose of making an effective social arrangement.

Nietzsche's philosophy is marked by his persistent rejection of the traditional notion that philosophy and science search for and find truth. In his early work (published in the 1870s), he tends to attack rationalism for promoting a mistaken belief in positive knowledge by confronting the rational with the irrational impulses that it must suppress. Later, he argues for a balance between reason and passion, seeing either one alone as incomplete and not fully human. In seeking to understand the irrational, Nietzsche focused, as had earlier Enlightenment philosophers, on psychology. He posits the "will to power" as a basic human motive and finds it in a wide array of actions. Gross displays of power, the recurrent attempts of indi-

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Footnote:

2 Nietzsche, pp. 23, 25.

886

ENLIGHTENMENT RHETORIC
viduals and groups to subjugate others, are only the most obvious manifestations. Art is an expression of the will to power as well: the desire to gain control over chaotic experience. The Greeks invented rhetoric to gain power over their audiences. And philosophy, too, comes from the human need to be in control of the world. The will to power is a motivating force, not good or bad in itself. Indeed, it is the stimulus for self-control, a quality Nietzsche admired and found necessary for creative and ethical action. The overman imagined by Nietzsche is one who has successfully organized the chaos of existence, one who strives for perfection and resists compromise with the forces of partial rationalism (represented by science and philosophy) and partial irrationalism (represented by religion).

Nietzsche's style is highly metaphorical. He does not hope — as Samuel Isseling points out clearly — to make possible a nonrhetorical philosophy by revealing some hitherto unnoticed error. To show that philosophy is rhetorical is certainly "to unmask the pretensions of philosophy," says Isseling, but Nietzsche emphasizes the rhetorical quality of his own writing by using "the boldest of metaphors," as well as poetry, drama, and aphorisms. Philosophy is inseparable from language, and no self-consciousness will alter or transcend that circumstance. For Nietzsche, the goal is not to discover the unvarnished truth, for there is no such thing. Rather, the aim is to understand the forces — such as the need to communicate and the will to power — that have produced those ideas about truth which have driven philosophy through its long history. This realization leads Nietzsche to see philosophy as a text. Philosophy is a form of interpretation, an attempt to see the world in a way that will allow human beings to gain some control over it. To examine a set of interpretations requires rhetorical analysis, and so it can be argued that Nietzsche's method is rhetorical as well.

Nietzsche's ideas have been little noted by rhetoricians until quite recently, even though he anticipates the most important themes developed by twentieth-century rhetorical theorists (see Part Five): I. A. Richards's fallacy of proper meaning, Richard Weaver's idea that language is sermonic, Chaim Perelman's analysis of naturalness as a rhetorical quality, and the wider movement that sees rhetoric as epistemic. Indeed, in seeing rhetoric as the basis of philosophy, Nietzsche goes beyond most modern theorists, even those who argue that rhetoric is epistemic. Nietzsche's work has deeply influenced twentieth-century philosophers Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, who are not afraid to continue along the path he blazed — and who have been the means by which Nietzsche's ideas have penetrated many fields.

Selected Bibliography

On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense

Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of "world history," but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die. — One might invent such a fable, and yet be still would not have adequately illustrated how miserable, how shadowy and transient, how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature. There were eternities during which it did not exist. And when it is all over with the human intellect, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has no additional mission which would lead it beyond human life. Rather, it is human, and only its possessor and begetter makes it so solemnly — as though the world’s axis turned within it. But if we could communicate with the gnat, we would learn that he likewise flies through the air with the same solemnity,2 that he feels the flying center of the universe within himself. There is nothing so reprehensible and unimportant in nature that it would not immediately swell up like a balloon

1A more literal, though less English, translation of Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne might be "On Truth and Lie in the Extramoral Sense."—[Tr.]

2Palaos. [Tr.]
at the slightest puff of this power of knowing. And just as every porter wants to have an admirer, so even the proudest of men, the philosopher, supposes that he sees on all sides the eyes of the universe telescopically focused upon his action and thought.

It is remarkable that this was brought about by the intellect, which was certainly allotted to these most unfortunate, delicate, and ephemeral beings merely as a device for detaining them a minute within existence. For without this addition they would have every reason to flee this existence as quickly as Lessing's son. The pride connected with knowing and sensibility lies like a binding log over the eyes and senses of men, thus deceiving them concerning the value of existence. For this pride contains within itself the most flattering estimation of the value of knowing. Deception is the most general effect of such pride, but even its most particular effects contain within themselves something of the same deceitful character.

"As a means for the preserving of the individual, the intellect unfolds its principle powers in dissimulation, which is the means by which weaker, less robust individuals preserve themselves — since they have been denied the chance to wage the battle for existence with horns or with the sharp teeth of beasts of prey. This art of dissimulation reaches its peak in man. Deception, flattering, lying, detesting, talking behind one's back, putting up a false front, living in borrowed splendor, wearing a mask, hiding behind convention, playing a role for others and for oneself — in short, a continuous flattering around the solitary flame of vanity — is so much the rule and the law among men that there is almost nothing which is less comprehensible than how an honest and pure drive for truth could have arisen among them. They are deeply imbedded in illusions and in dream images; their senses merely glide over the surface of things and forms." Their senses nowhere lead to truth; on the contrary, they are content to receive stimuli, as it were, to engage in a groping game in the backs of things. Moreover, man permits himself to be deceived in his dreams every night of his life. His moral sentiment does not even make an attempt to prevent this, whereas there are supposed to be men who have stopped snoring through sheer will power. What does man actually know about himself? Is he, indeed, ever able to perceive himself completely, as if laid out in a lighted display case? Does nature not conceal most things from him — even concerning his own body — in order to confine and lock him within a proud, deceptive consciousness, aloof from the coils of the bowels, the rapid flow of the blood stream, and the intricate quivering of the fibers? She threw away the key. And woe to that fatal curiosity which might one day have the power to peer out and down through a crack in the chamber of consciousness and then suspect that man is sustained in the indifference of his ignorance by that which is pitiful, greedy, insatiable, and murderous — as if hanging in dreams on the back of a tiger. Given this situation, where in the world could the drive for truth have come from?

Insofar as the individual wants to maintain himself against other individuals, he will under natural circumstances employ the intellect mainly for dissimulation. But at the same time, from boredom and necessity, man wishes to exist socially and with the herd; therefore, he needs to make peace and strives accordingly to banish from his world at least the most flagrant bellum omni contra omnes. This peace treaty brings in its wake something which appears to be the first step toward acquiring that puzzling truth drive: to wit, that which shall count as "truth" from now on is established. That is to say, a uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things, and this legislation of language likewise establishes the first laws of truth. For the contrast between truth and lie arises here for the first time. The liar is a person who uses the valid designations, the words, in order to make something which is unequal appear to be real. He says, for example, "I am rich," when the proper designation for his condition would be "poor." He misuses fixed conventions by means of arbitrary sub-

* A reference to the offspring of Lessing and Eva König, who died on the day of his birth. [Tr.]

"War of each against all." [Tr.]
stitutions or even reversals of names. If he does this in a selfish and moreover harmful manner, society will cease to trust him and will thereby exclude him. Where men avoid by excluding the liar is not so much being defrauded as it is being harmed by means of fraud. Thus, even at this stage, what they hate is basically not deception itself, but rather the unpleasant, hated consequences of certain sorts of deception. It is in a similarly restricted sense that man now wants nothing but truth: he desires the pleasant, life-preserving consequences of truth. He is indifferent toward pure knowledge which has no consequences; toward those truths which are possibly harmful and destructive he is even hostilely inclined. And besides, what about these linguistic conventions themselves? Are they perhaps products of knowledge, that is, of the sense of truth? Are designations congruent with things? Is language the adequate expression of all realities?

It is only by means of forgetfulness that man can ever reach the point of fancying himself to possess a "truth" of the grade just indicated. If he will not be satisfied with truth in the form of tautology, that is to say, if he will not be content with empty husks, then he will always exchange truths for illusions. What is a word? Is it the copy in sound of a nerve stimulus. But the further inference from the nerve stimulus to a cause outside of us is already the result of a false and unjustifiable application of the principle of sufficient reason. If truth alone had been the deciding factor in the genesis of language, and if the standpoint of certainty had been decisive for designations, then how could we still dare to say "the stone is hard," as if "hard" were something otherwise familiar to us, and not merely a totally subjective stimulation? We separate things according to gender, designating the tree as masculine and the plant as feminine. What arbitrary assignments! How far this oversteps the canons of certainty! We speak of a "snake": this designation touches only upon its ability to twist itself and could therefore also fit a worm. What arbitrary differentiations! What one-sided preferences, first for this, then for that property of a thing! The various languages placed side by side show that with words it is never a question of truth, never a question of adequate expression; otherwise there would not be so many languages. The "thing in itself" (which is precisely what the pure truth, apart from any of its consequences, would be) is likewise something quite incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the least worth striving for. This creator only designates the relations of things to men, and for expressing these relations he lays hold of the boldest metaphors. To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image, first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor. And each time there is a complete overlapping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one. One can imagine a man who is totally deaf and has never had a sensaion of sound and music. Perhaps such a person will gaze with astonishment at Chladni's sound figures; perhaps he will discover their causes in the vibrations of the string and will now swear that he must know what man mean by "sound." It is this way with all of us concerning language: we believe that we know something about the things themselves.

*Note that Nietzsche is here engaged in an implicit critique of Schopenhauer, who had been guilty of precisely this misapplication of the principle of sufficient reason in his first book, The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. It is quite wrong to think that Nietzsche was ever wholly uncritical of Schopenhauer's philosophy (see, for example, the little essay, "Kritik der Schopenhauerschen Philosophie" from 1867, in MA I, pp. 392-401). [Tr.]

*welche willkürlich erlebten Vererbungen. The specific sense of this passage depends upon the fact that all ordinary nouns in the German language are assigned a gender: the tree is der Baum; the plant is die Pflanze. This assignment of an original sexual property to all things is the "transference" in question. On the translation of the key term Vererbung, see the "Introduction" and P. n. 83. [Tr.]

*This passage depends upon the etymological relation between the German words Schlange (snake) and schlingen (to wind or twist), both of which are related to the Old High German slúngo. [Tr.]

*Ein Nervenkraft, zaumt übertragen in ein Bild. The "image" in this case is the visual image, what we "see." [Tr.]
when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things — metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities. In the same way that the sound appears as a sand figure, so the mysterious X of the thing in itself first appears as a nerve stimulus, then as an image, and finally as a sound. Thus the genesis of language does not proceed logically in any case, and all the material within and with which the man of truth, the scientist, and the philosopher later work and build, if not derived from never-never land, is at least not derived from the essence of things.

In particular, let us further consider the formation of concepts. Every word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin; but rather, a word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases — which means, purely and simply, cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal. Every concept arises from the equation of unequal things. Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is certain that the concept “leaf” is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects. This awareness is the idea that, in addition to the leaves, there exists in nature the “leaf”; the original model according to which all the leaves were perhaps woven, sketched, measured, colored, curled, and painted — but by incompetent hands, so that no specimen has turned out to be a correct, trustworthy, and faithful likeness of the original model. We call a person “honest,” and then we ask “why has he behaved so honestly today?” Our usual answer is, “on account of his honesty.” Honesty! This in turn means that the leaf is the cause of the leaves. We know nothing whatsoever about an essential quality called “honesty”; but we do know of countless individualized and consequently unequal actions which we equate by omitting the aspects in which they are unequal and which we now designate as “honest” actions.

Finally we formulate from them a qualitas occulta which has the name “honesty.” We obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and actual; whereas nature is acquainted with no forms and no concepts, and likewise with no species, but only with an X which remains inaccessible and indefinable for us. For even our contrast between individual and species is something anthropomorphistic and does not originate in the essence of things; although we should not presume to claim that this contrast does not correspond to the essence of things: that would of course be a dogmatic assertion and, as such, would be just as indemonstrable as its opposite.

What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usafe, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drugged of sensuous force, coins which have lost their emboossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.

We still do not yet know where the drive for truth comes from. For so far we have heard only of the duty which society imposes in order to exist: to be truthful means to employ the usual metaphors. Thus, to express it morally, this is the duty to lie according to a fixed convention, to lie with the herd and in a manner binding upon everyone. Now man of course forgets that this is the way things stand for him. Thus he lies, in the manner indicated, unconsciously and in accordance with habits which are centuries’ old; and precisely by means of this unconsciousness and forgetfulness he arrives, in his sense of truth. From the sense that one is obliged to designate one thing as “red,” another as “cold,” and a third as “mute,” there arises a moral impulse in regard to truth. The venerability, reliability, and utility of truth is something which a person demon-
states for himself from the contrast with the liar, whom no one trusts and everyone excludes. As a "rational" being, he now places his behavior under the control of abstractions. He will no longer tolerate being carried away by sudden impressions, by intuitions. First he universalizes all these impressions into less colorful, cooler concepts, so that he can entrusted the guidance of his life and conduct to them. Everything which distinguishes man from the animals depends upon this ability to volatilize perceptual metaphors\(^3\) in a schema, and thus to dissolve an image into a concept. For something is possible in the realm of these schemata which could never be achieved with the vivid first impressions: the construction of a pyramidal order according to castes and degrees, the creation of a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations, and clearly marked boundaries — a new world, one which now confronts that other vivid world of first impressions as more solid, more universal, better known, and more human than the immediately perceived world, and thus as the regulative and imperative world. Whereas each perceptual metaphor is individual and without equals and is therefore able to elude all classification, the great edifice of concepts displays the rigid regularity of a Roman columbarium\(^4\) and exhales in logic that strength and coolness which is characteristic of mathematics. Anyone who has felt this cool breath of logic will hardly believe that even the concept — which is as bony, foursquare, and transposable as a die — is nevertheless merely the residue of a metaphor, and that the illusion which is involved in the artistic transference of a nerve stimulus into images is, if not the mother, then the grandmother of every single concept.\(^5\)

But in this conceptual crap game "truth" means using every die in the designated manner, counting its spots accurately, fashioning the right categories, and never violating the order of caste and class rank. Just as the Romans and Etruscans cut up the heavens with rigid mathematical lines and confined a god within each of the spaces thereby delimited, as within a templum,\(^6\) so every people has a similarly mathematically divided conceptual heaven above themselves and henceforth thinks that truth demands that each conceptual god be sought only within his own sphere. Here one may certainly admire man as a mighty genius of construction, who succeeds in piling up an infinitely complicated dome of concepts upon an unstable foundation, and, as it were, on running water. Of course, in order to be supported by such a foundation, his construction must be like one constructed of spiders' webs: delicate enough to be carried along by the waves, strong enough not to be blown apart by every wind. As a genius of construction man raises himself far above the bee in the following way: whereas the bee builds with wax that he gathers from nature, man builds with the far more delicate conceptual material which he first has to manufacture from himself. In this he is greatly to be admired, but not on account of his drive for truth or for pure knowledge of things. When someone hides something behind a bush and looks for it again in the same place and finds it there as well, there is not much to praise in such seeking and finding. Yet this is how matters stand regarding seeking and finding "truth" within the realm of reason. If I make up the definition of a mammal, and then, after inspecting a camel, declare "look, a mammal," I have indeed brought a truth to light in this way, but it is a truth of limited value. That is to say, it is a thoroughly anthropomorphic truth which contains not a single point which would be "true in itself" or really and universally valid apart from man. At bottom, what the investigator of such truths is seeking is only the metamorphosis of the world into man. He strives to understand the world as something analogous to man, and at best he achieves by his struggles the feeling of assimilation. Similar to the way in which astrologers considered the stars to be in man's service and connected with his happiness and sorrow, such an investigator con-

\(^3\)Ver anschaulichen Metaphern... The adjective anschaulich has the additional sense of "vivid" — as in the next sentence ("vivid first impressions"). [Tr.]

\(^4\)A columbarium is a vault with niches for funeral urns containing the ashes of cremated bodies. [Tr.]

\(^5\)I.e., concepts are derived from images, which are, in turn, derived from nerve stimuli. [Tr.]

\(^6\)A delimited space restricted to a particular purpose, especially a religiously sanctified area. [Tr.]
the entire universe in connection with man: the entire universe as the infinitely fractured echo of one original sound — man; the entire universe as the infinitely multiplied copy of one original picture — man. His method is to treat man as the measure of all things, but in doing so he can proceed from the error of believing that he has these things [which he intends to measure] immediately before him as mere objects. He forgets that the original, perceptual metaphors are metaphors and takes them to be the things themselves.

Only by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor can one live with any repose, security, and consistency; only by means of the petrification and congelation of a mass of images which originally streamed from the primal faculty of human imagination like a fiery liquid, only in the annulable faith that this sun, this window, this table is a truth in itself, in short, only by forgetting that he himself is an artistically creating subject, does man live with any repose, security, and consistency. If but for an instant he could escape from the prison walls of this faith, his self-consciousness would be immediately destroyed. It is even a difficult thing for him to admit to himself that the insect or the bird perceives an entirely different world from the one that man does, and that the question of which of these perceptions of the world is the more correct one is quite meaningless, for this would have to have been decided previously in accordance with the criterion of the correct perception, which means, in accordance with a criterion which is not available. But in any case it seems to me that the correct perception — which would mean "the adequate expression of an object in the subject" — is a contradictory impossibility.17

Be between two absolutely different spheres, as between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness, and no expression; there is, at most, an aesthetic relation:18 I mean, a suggestive transference, a stammering translation into a completely foreign tongue — for which there

is required, in any case, a freely inventive intermediate sphere and mediating force. "Appearance" is a word that contains many temptations, which is why I avoid it as much as possible. For it is not true that the essence of things "appears" in the empirical world. A painter without hands who wished to express in song the picture before his mind would, by means of this substitution of spheres, still reveal more about the essence of things than does the empirical world. Even the relationship of a nerve stimulus to the generated image is not a necessary one. But when the same image has been generated millions of times and has been handed down for many generations and finally appears on the same occasion every time for all mankind, then it acquires at last the same meaning for men it would have if it were the sole necessary image and if the relationship of the original nerve stimulus to the generated image were a strictly causal one. In the same manner, an eternally repeated dream would certainly be felt and judged to be reality. But the hardening and congealing of a metaphor guarantees absolutely nothing concerning its necessity and exclusive justification.

Every person who is familiar with such considerations has no doubt felt a deep mistrust of all idealism of this sort; just as often as he has quite clearly convinced himself of the eternal consistency, omnipresence, and infallibility of the laws of nature. He has concluded that so far as we can penetrate here — from the telescopic heights to the microscopic depths — everything is secure, complete, infinite, regular, and without any gaps. Science will be able to dig successfully in this shaft forever, and all the things that are discovered will harmonize with and not contradict each other. How little does this resemble a product of the imagination, for if it were such, there should be some place where the illusion and unreality can be divined. Against this, the following must be said: if each of us had a different kind of sense perception — if we could only perceive things now as a bird, now as a worm, now as a plant, or if one of us saw a stimulus as red, another as blue, while a third even heard the same stimulus as a sound — then no one would speak of such a regularity of nature, rather, nature would be grasped only as a

17 "ein widerspruchsvolles Verhalten. [Tr.]"
18 "eine ästhetische Verhältnis. A more literal translation of "relation" is "behavior," "attitude," or perhaps "disposition." [Tr.]

NIETZSCHE | ON TRUTH AND LIES IN A NONMORAL SENSE 893
creation which is subjective in the highest degree. After all, what is a law of nature as such for us? We are not acquainted with it in itself, but only with its effects, which means in its relation to other laws of nature—which, in turn, are known to us only as sums of relations. Therefore all these relations always refer again to others and are thoroughly incomprehensible to us in their essence. All that we actually know about these laws of nature is what we ourselves bring to them—time and space, and therefore relationships of succession and number. But everything marvelous about the laws of nature, everything that quite astonishes us therein and seems to humble our explanation, everything that might lead us to distrust idealism: all this is completely and solely contained within the mathematical strictness and inviolable of our representations of time and space. But we produce these representations in and from ourselves with the same necessity with which the spider spins. If we are forced to comprehend all things only under these forms, then it ceases to be amazing that in all things we actually comprehend nothing but these forms. For they must all bear within themselves the laws of number, and it is precisely number which is most astonishing in things. All that conformity to law, which impresses us so much in the movement of the stars and in chemical processes, coincides at bottom with those properties which we bring to things. Thus it is we who impress ourselves in this way. In conjunction with this it of course follows that the artistic process of metaphor formation with which every sensation begins in us already presupposes these forms and thus occurs within them. The only way in which the possibility of subsequently constructing a new conceptual edifice from metaphors themselves can be explained is by the firm persistence of these original forms. That is to say, this conceptual edifice is an imitation of temporal, spatial, and numerical relationships in the domain of metaphor. 19

We have seen how it is originally language which works on the construction of concepts, a labor taken over in later ages by science. Just as the bee simultaneously constructs cells and fills them with honey, so science works unceasingly on this great columbarium of concepts, the graveyard of perceptions. It is always building new, higher stories and shoring up, cleaning, and renovating the old cells; above all, it takes pains to fill up this monstrously towering framework and to arrange therein the entire empirical world, which is to say, the anthropomorphic world. Whereas the man of action binds his life to reason and its concepts so that he will not be swept away and lost, the scientific investigator builds his hut right next to the tower of science so that he will be able to work on it and to find shelter for himself beneath those bulwarks which presently exist. And he requires shelter, for there are frightful powers which continually break in upon him, powers which oppose scientific "truth" with completely different kinds of "truths" which bear on their shields the most varied sorts of emblems.

The drive toward the formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive, which one cannot for a single instant dispense with in thought; for one would thereby dispense with man himself. This drive is not truly vanquished and scarcely subdued by the fact that a regular and rigid new world is constructed as its prison from its own ephemeral products, the concepts. It seeks a new realm and another channel for its activity, and it finds this in myth and in art generally. This drive continually confuses the conceptual categories and cells by bringing forward new transferences, metaphors, and metonymies. It continually manifests an ardent desire to re-fashion the world which presents itself to waking man, so that it will be as colorful, irregularr, lacking in results and coherence, charming, and

19 This is where section 1 of the fair copy made by von Gerold speaks. But according to Schlecht (in Schlecht/Ande, pp. 14-5) Nietzsche's preliminary version continued as follows:

Empty space and empty time are ideas which are possible

894 ENLIGHTENMENT RHETORIC
eterally new as the world of dreams. Indeed, it is only by means of the rigid and regular web of concepts that the waking man clearly sees that he is awake; and it is precisely because of this that he sometimes thinks that he must be dreaming when this web of concepts is torn by art. Pascal is right in maintaining that if the same dream came to us every night we would be just as occupied with it as we are with the things that we see every day. “If a workman were sure to dream for twelve straight hours every night that he was king,” said Pascal, “I believe that he would be just as happy as a king who dreams for twelve hours every night that he was a workman.” In fact, because of the way that myth takes it for granted that miracles are always happening, the waking life of a mythically inspired people — the ancient Greeks, for instance — more closely resembles a dream than it does the waking world of a scientifically disenchanting thinker. When every tree can suddenly speak as a nymph, when the god in the shape of a bull can drag away maidens, when even the goddess Athena herself is suddenly seen in the company of Peisistratus driving through the market place of Athens with a beautiful team of horses — and this is what the honest Athenian believed — then, as in a dream, anything is possible at each moment, and all of nature swarms around man as if it were nothing but a masquerade of the gods, who were merely amusing themselves by deceiving men in all these shapes.

But man has an invincible inclination to allow himself to be deceived and is, as it were, enchanted with happiness when the rhapsodist tells him epic fables as if they were true, or when the actor in the theater acts more royally than any real king. So long as it is able to deceive without injuring, that master of deception, the intellect, is free; it is released from its former slavery and celebrates its Saturnalia. It is never more luxuriant, richer, prouder, more clever, and more daring. With creative pleasure it throws metaphors into confusion and displaces the boundary stones of abstractions, so that, for example, it designates the stream as “the moving path which carries man where he would otherwise walk.” The intellect has now thrown the token of bondage from itself. At other times it endeavors, with gloomy officiousness, to show the way and to demonstrate the tools to a poor individual who covets existence; it is like a servant who goes in search of booty and prey for his master. But now it has become the master and it dares to wipe from its face the expression of indigence. In comparison with its previous conduct, everything that it now does bears the mark of dissimulation, just as that previous conduct did of distortion. The free intellect copies human life, but it considers this life to be something good and seems to be quite satisfied with it. That immense framework and planking of concepts to which the needy man clings his whole life long in order to preserve himself is nothing but a scaffolding and toy for the most audacious feats of the liberated intellect. And when it smashes this framework to pieces, throws it into confusion, and puts it back together in an ironic fashion, pairing the most alien things and separating the closest, it is demonstrating that it has no need of these makeshifts of indigence and that it will now be guided by intuitions rather than by concepts. There is no regular path which leads from these intuitions into the land of ghostly schemata, the land of abstractions. There exists no word for these intuitions; when man sees them he grows dumb, or else he speaks only in forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of concepts. He does this so that by shattering and mocking the old conceptual barriers he may at least correspond creatively to the impression of the powerful present intuition.

There are ages in which the rational man and the intuitive man stand side by side, the one in

\[\text{Pascal}, \text{ number } 386. \text{ Actually, Pascal says that the workman would be "almost as happy" as the king in this case!} \text{[Tr.]}\]

\[\text{2 According to the story told by Herodotus (Histories 1, 69) the tyrant Peisistratus adopted the following ruse to secure his popular acceptance upon his return from exile: he entered Athens in a chariot accompanied by a woman named Phye who was dressed in the costume of Athena. Thus the people were supposed to have been convinced that it was the goddess herself who was conducting the tyrant back to the Acropolis.} \text{[Try]}\]

\[\text{Verstellung.} \text{[Tr.]}\]

\[\text{Verzierung.} \text{[Tr.]}\]
fear of intuition, the other with scorn for abstraction. The latter is just as irrational as the former is inartistic. They both desire to rule over life: the former, by knowing how to meet his principle needs by means of foresight, prudence, and regularity; the latter, by disregarding these needs and, as an "overjoyed hero," counting as real only that life which has been disguised as illusion and beauty. Whenever, as was perhaps the case in ancient Greece, the intuitive man handles his weapons more authoritatively and victoriously than his opponent, then, under favorable circumstances, a culture can take shape and art's mastery over life can be established. All the manifestations of such a life will be accompanied by this dissimulation, this disavowal of indigence, this glitter of metaphorical intuitions, and, in general, this immediacy of deception: neither the house, nor the gait, nor the clothes, nor the clay jugs give evidence of having been invented because of a pressing need. It seems as if they were all intended to express an exalted happiness, an Olympian cloudlessness, and, as it were, a playing with seriousness. The man who is guided by concepts and abstractions only succeeds by such means in warding off misfortune, without ever gaining any happiness for himself from these abstractions. And while he aims for the greatest possible freedom from pain, the intuitive man, standing in the midst of a culture, already reaps from his intuition a harvest of continually inflowing illumination, cheer, and redemption — in addition to obtaining a defense against misfortune. To be sure, he suffers more intensely, when he suffers; he even suffers more frequently, since he does not understand how to learn from experience and keeps falling over and over again into the same ditch. He is then just as irrational in sorrow as he is in happiness: he cries aloud and will not be consoled. How differently the stoical man who learns from experience and governs himself by concepts is affected by the same misfortunes! This man, who at other times seeks nothing but sincerity, truth, freedom from deception, and protection against ensuring surprise attacks, now executes a masterpiece of deception: he executes his masterpiece of deception in misfortune, as the other type of man executes his in times of happiness. He wears no quivering and changeable human face, but, as it were, a mask with dignified, symmetrical features. He does not cry; he does not even alter his voice. When a real storm cloud thunders above him, he wraps himself in his cloak, and with slow steps he walks from beneath it.